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A Subsidy Driven Decision Procedure to Mitigate
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Abstract—One of the main aims of telecommunication sub-
sidies in developing countries is to extend the information and
communication services to the information “have nots” through
subsidized communication services. However, subsidies may have
an impact on network resource utilization, quality of service and
the amount of revenue generated. For example, subsidies may
lead to low Quality of Service (QoS) and high resource utilization
while in some instances unsubsidized services may lead to high
quality of services and low utilization of resources. This see-saw
effect may eventually lead to market failure and it may, now
and then, destroy market efficiency. This phenomenon calls for a
combined study, in which the relationship between subsidy, price,
QoS and resource utilization is investigated. In this paper, the
impact of subsidies on quality of service and resource utilization
in multitier communities is investigated. We try to find a middle
ground between implementation of subsidy policy and its effects
on QoS and resource utilization in a network.
Index Terms—Pricing policy, Quality of service, Subsidy, ICTs
I. INTRODUCTION
IN one way or another, over-pricing or under-pricing ofnetworks service provision in underserviced or unserved
regions of developing countries has created resource prob-
lems associated with under-usage or over-exploitation of such
resources [4] [2]. Such under-usage or over-exploitation of
resources in rural areas or underserviced regions of develop-
ing countries, arise from incompletely defined and enforced
pricing policies and legal framework within such countries.
This situation is further compounded by the problems asso-
ciated with subsidy allocation by governments of developing
countries when trying to promote social and economic agendas
for its “needy” people [9].
Many arguments have risen on the usage of subsidies to
promote social and economic agendas in developing [10]. On
one hand literature points out that the usage of subsidies to
enhance social and economical growth in a competitive market
is not feasible and may distort market efficiency [3] [4] [5].
Other social-economical proponents of subsidies have argued,
to the contrary, that subsidies are a necessity to promote,
through lowering down of prices, social and economic growth
in purely monopolistic market economies.
One alternative study is, however, presented by Alesina
and Rodrik [14] who showed that income disparities had an
M. Sumbwanyambe is with the Department of Mechanical Engineering
Science, University of Johannesburg, P.O. Box 524, Auckland Park, 2006,
South Africa, e-mail:sumbwam@gmail.com
A. L. Nel is with the Department of Mechanical Engineering Science,
University of Johannesburg, P.O. Box 524, Auckland Park, 2006, South Africa,
e-mail:andren@uj.ac.za
adverse effect on the country’s economic growth, as such
subsidies may promote economic growth. They showed that in
more imbalanced communities, social and economic growth is
lower because the demand for fiscal redistribution financed by
distortionary taxation is higher [7].
Amegashie [11] agrees that implementing a subsidy, “by
reducing the price of the commodity, may increase the con-
sumption of the commodity towards the equilibrium (perfectly)
competitive quantity, given that output was initially too low”
and if chosen properly a subsidy may “move the economy
towards the perfectly competitive equilibrium quantity”.
Fig. 1. Price discrimination may lead to: (a) underuse in Gautrain (tragedy
of anti-commons) or (b) overuse in metro-rail (tragedy of the commons) of
resources
Without doubt, income inequality in developing countries
fuels social discontent and increases socio-political instability.
The uncertainty in the politico-economic environment reduces
investment which in turn reduces growth in underserviced
areas or rural areas.
Subsidies, though seen as the means of promoting social
and economic agendas in developing countries1, can create the
tragedies associated with public resources usage or something-
for-nothing resources [2] [5]. Given a subsidy rate, consumers
of developing countries usually anticipate a net social benefit
derived from free resources due to subsidy or under pricing
of such resources. Anticipation of net social benefits from
such resources may generate a damaging rush from consumers
to exploit the resource, which may result in the tragedy of
the commons. By definition the tragedy of the commons is a
situation when “ multiple owners are each endowed with the
privilege to use a given resource and no one has the right
to exclude another. When too many such people have the
privileges to use, the resource is prone to over use [6].
1“A novel idea to take voice and data services to the most rural areas could
see Vodacom and MTN paid subsidies to do the job. The operators have to
promise high-quality services even the poorest people can afford in return for
having up to 80% of infrastructure subsidized. But the cost will not affect
taxpayers as the cash will come from the Universal Service Fund, to which
the operators themselves contribute” [15]
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On the contrary, when no subsidy is given, consumers face
no differential between the perceived utility and the cost of the
resource, as such very few consumers or users will create a
damaging rush towards resource utilization creating a no social
and pecuniary benefit to users. Generally, exogenous factors,
such as exorbitant pricing or the absence of subsidy rates can
decrease network resource usage and can make network usage
in developing countries less effective. Heller in [1] defines
the anti-commons as a situation where “multiple owners are
each endowed with the right to exclude others from a scarce
resource, and no one has an effective privilege of use”.
Indeed, the implementation of subsidies may create a situa-
tion where the commodity is over utilized, because it is highly
subsidized, or underutilized, because it under subsidized. This
may create a problem that affects the market efficiency and
social and economic growth of developing countries.
In light of the above problems, correct subsidy driven
decision procedures are necessary in order to avoid the tragedy
of the commons and the tragedy of the anti-commons. In
this paper we will implement a subsidy decision procedure
to prevent the tragedy of the commons or anti-commons in
multi-tier communities.
II. DEFINING AND MODELING THE PARAMETERS
As defined in [2] [13], we consider a multi-tier community
whose population profile comprises of heterogeneous type
of consumers with an observable disparity in reservation
prices; the information “haves” (N2) and “have-nots” (N1).
In many multi-tier communities, as in case of developing
countries, customers have different service requirements. In
such developing countries, service providers can offer different
prices for each consumer and can choose a suitable price based
on consumers’ needs and acceptance of the quoted price and
adjust their price accordingly so as to obtain an optimal price
at which both types of consumers will be more willing to pay
for the service. As Sumbwanyambe, Nel and Clarke [2] have
stated, “these parameters can be learned through a market price
adaptive research which estimates the number of consumers
that accept a given price. In fact, the process of learning price
parameters in such a market is a dynamic process with the
aim of adjusting the quoted price in line with the consumers’
behavior towards price dynamics”. We will assume that the
two types of consumers have differing reservation price.
Definition 1 Reservation price (sometimes called the thresh-
old price), pthi for i ∈ (1, 2) is the price at which a customer
is indifferent between subscribing to the current network or
opting out of the current network and subscribing to the other
network or dropping them all. 2
Furthermore we assume that p1 and p2 is the price that is
payable to the service provider by the consumers N1 and N2,
respectively, where p1 = βp2, for 0 < β < 1 and p2 ∈ (0, p∞)
and c1,2 is the cost of providing such services to N1 and
N2. β is the subsidy factor provided by the government. We
use a simple cut-off price rule to determine whether the user
would subscribe to the ISP or not. In the current context the
cut-off rule is based on users’ reservation price i.e. pth1 and
pth2, for N1 and N2 consumers. For any given price, those
customers whose reservation price are greater than or equal
to the given price will purchase the service provided by the
ISP or the service provider. A price setting service provider
in collaboration with government uses the information in the
distribution of reservation prices to choose its optimal price.
III. THE TYRANNY OF SUBSIDY AND PRICE SENSITIVITY
ON NETWORK RESOURCES
Subsidies and price sensitivity has an adverse effect on
resources utilization in multi-tier communities. From the users’
point of view, subsidies affect their behavior in terms of
network resources utilization, which is correlated to their
price sensitivities. From the government and service provider’s
perspective, choosing the right subsidy is of great importance
in maximizing revenue and enhancing the optimal usage
of resources. Therefore, correct subsidization of deserving
customers or consumers in underserviced areas is of great im-
portance if tragedies in such communities are to be avoided. In
underserviced region of South Africa and Zambia willingness
to pay is associated with a number of factors. Primarily, any
heterogeneous user is assumed to maximize utility subject to
a predetermined level of his or her income.
In a heterogeneous society (especially in developing coun-
tries), subsidy and price sensitivity can lead to the tragedy
of the (anti) commons [12]. If too large a subsidy (β = 0)
is given and the price sensitivity is close to 1 (i.e. α = 1),
consumers will demand more than is available, creating the
tragedy of the commons [6]. In order to prevent the tragedy of
the commons, service providers and government policy makers
have to cut the subsidy level and increase the price which will
eventually reduce the number of consumers. The decrease in
the number of consumers (especially rural consumers) may
then lead to the tragedy of the anti-commons [1], leaving a gap
in government policy and objectives of promoting social and
economic growth. In such an eventuality, the government will
have to increase the subsidy and lower the prices yet again
in order fulfill their objectives. This creates what is known
as a see-saw effect. The following example demonstrates this
effect:
Let’s take that 0 < p1 ≤ pth1 and 0 < p2 ≤ pth2,
there exists a NE at which all users i.e. N1 and N2, will
attempt to maximize their utilities, upth1,p1 and upth2,p2, given
the reservation price pth1 and pth2 and the price p1and p2
charged by the service provider. Such a development will lead
to both users i.e. the information “haves” and “have nots”
trying to maximize their utility. This utilization of resources
without restraint will, more likely, result in the “tragedy of the
commons”. Once more, if 0 ≤ pth1 ≤ p1 and 0 ≤ pth2 ≤ p2
the tragedy of the anti-commons is a more likely outcome. If
the utility of one user is positive and the other user is negative,
then the free rider problem is likely to occur. The following
definitions are applicable in equilibrium:
Definition 2 Given that 0 ≤ p1 ≤ pth1 and 0 ≤ p2 ≤ pth2
the population profile of N1 and N2 users are in equilibrium
if it does not pay for any member of the group to opt out of
any ISP. 2
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Definition 3 Given that 0 ≤ pth1 ≤ p1 and 0 ≤ pth2 ≤ p2
the population profile of N1 and N2 users are in equilibrium
if it does not pay for any member of the group to subscribe
to any ISP. 2
Definition 4 Given any price p1 and p2 the population profile
of N1 and N2 users are not in equilibrium if it pays for any
member of the group to join another group. 2
Having put up the above definitions, the following Lemma
will show that given the prices, p1 and p2, and the reservation
price, and if all users receive an equal negative or positive
utility, users are unlikely to switch to another group or free
ride or opt out.
Lemma 1 Given 0 ≤ p1 ≤ pth1, 0 ≤ p2 ≤ pth2 and p1 < p2,
for any values of p1 and p2 the situation is in equilibrium if
upth2,p2 − p2 = upth1,p1 − p1. 2
Proof: From definition 7.3 the situation is in equilibrium
if the information “have-nots” and “haves”do not have a
unilaterally decision to change from their present strategy
to another. If the utility of the information “haves” is less
than 0 i.e. upth2,p2 − p2 < 0, no N2 users will subscribe
to the ISP. Similarly if the utility of the information “haves-
nots” is less than zero i.e. upth1,p1 − p1 < 0, there will
be no N1 users who will subscribe to the ISP. Otherwise if
upth2,p2− p2 < upth1,p1− p1 a free rider problem is likely to
occur.
From the Lemma above we can draw the following conclu-
sions:
• If there are no N2 users subscribing to the ISP then the
utility of such population group is zero i.e. upth2,p2−p2 <
0
• If there are no N1 users subscribing to the ISP then it
means that the utility of the N1 is zero i.e. upth1,p1−p1 <
0
These two statements will lead us to the following corollary
describing the structure of the equilibrium.
Corollary 1 Define pi = [p1, p2, pth1, pth2] an equilibrium
has the following structure:
• It is the tragedy of the commons if upth2,p2−p2 ≥ 0 and
upth1,p1 − p1 ≥ 0 where p2 ≈ 0 and p1 ≈ 0.
• It is the tragedy of the anti-commons if upth2,p2−p2 ≤ 0
and upth1,p1 − p1 ≤ 0 for all users in the network.
• It is likely to be a free rider problem when upth2,p2−p2 ≤
0 and upth1,p1 − p1 ≥ 0 and upth2,p2 − p2 ≥ 0 and
upth1,p1 − p1 ≤ 0 2
IV. SUBSIDY, SOCIAL DILEMMAS, PRICE AND REVENUE
MAXIMIZATION
In this section we provide a numerical and a graphical
analysis of results on how the subsidy affects the number
of users and ultimately how it affects the revenue of the
service provider. We take into consideration the dynamics
of a heterogeneous community with an observable difference
between the reservation price of the information “haves” and
information “have-nots”.
A. A Local decision procedure for the tragedy of the commons
and the tragedy of the anti-commons problem
This section gives a brief overview of a distributed
algorithm to solve the problem of the tragedy of the
commons and the tragedy of the anti-commons and also
discusses the convergence of the algorithm to equilibrium.
The algorithm can be used to determine the optimal values of
α and β and the maximum revenue at which the utilization of
network resources will be optimal. The algorithm is as follows:
Algorithm
Step 1: Define the initial values p2, pth1, pth2, α and β
and bandwidth.
Step 2 Calculate the number of users by using equation 7.4
Step 3:Calculate the amount of packets (Ttotal) sent by users
by using equation 7.8
Step 4: If (Ttotal) is greater than bandwidth add β + 0.1 and
p2 + 1
Step 5: If (Ttotal) is less or equal to 0 (bandwidth usage is
minimal) start β − 0.1 and p2 − 1
Step 6: Go to step 3, 4, 5
Step 7: Calculate the final value of p2 and p1β
Step 8: If final p2 = p1β = pth2. STOP. Optimal β solution
found
Step 9: Calculate maximum revenue Π using equation 1 and
the value of p2 by equating equation 2=0
Step 10 Government and ISP (service provider) maintains
values of β and p2. Repeat step 8 and 9
Convergence to equilibrium: The system reaches equilib-
rium when all agents reach Step 9 of the algorithm. At this
state, the government and the service provider feels that any
increment or decrement in the value of β and p2 will either
reduce or increase its utility. Hence the number of packets in
the system does not change. After step 4 the government and
the service provider may either decrease the value of subsidy
or increase the price p2. After step 3 the service provider
calculates the number of packets or bandwidth used. (Note
that in this case the number of packets used is proportional
to the number of users subscribing to the ISP hence number
of packets can be measured in terms of number of users). If
the amount of packets sent is less than the total bandwidth,
the government increments the subsidy factor and the ISP
decrements the price p2. A rational government and ISP can
reason after Step 3 that to prevent over-utilization of the
resource (tragedy of the commons) it should either decrease
the subsidy or increase the price by using Step 4. Similarly
if the government wants to prevent the tragedy of the anti-
commons it should increase the subsidy or decrease the price
p2 by using step 5.
The government and ISP can use probabilistic searching
scheme outlined in Steps 4 through 6 to reach its optimum
load. If the total number of packets sent is greater than the
bandwidth, the government starts with an initial increment
probability of subsidy factor by a factor of 0.1 and the
price is increased by a determined increment factor. If the
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subsidy increment produces a lower utility for the users, the
government and the service provider will follow step 5. Both
the government and the ISP keep on probing in this manner
until an optimal solution is reached where no users will deviate
from his present status. At such a point government and ISP
maintains the value of β and p2 as shown in Figure 4. Our
claim is that when equilibrium is reached, the combined load
on the resource is exactly the critical load or capacity of the
resource; i.e. the agents are using the resource optimally. They
have reached this optimality through a distributed decision
procedure using only local knowledge and with the directive
of government.
B. Numerical and graphical analysis
In a developing country a complex relationship that exists
between heterogeneous communities escalates the problem of
developing a two tier workable pricing model. Customers have
different income levels, sensitivities toward price and different
reservation prices for a particular service. This problem is
further compounded by the problem of subsidies and how to
properly allocate subsidies to the “needy” or the information
“haves nots”, without creating the tragedy of commons and
the tragedy of the anti-commons. When over-subsidization
and over-pricing of network resources creates the undesirable
outcomes of the tragedy of commons and tragedy of anti-
commons, it is necessary for the service provider and the
government to subsidize and price network resources in an
optimal way. In the next section we provide a numerical
analysis and graphical analysis to make our statement more
clearer.
Numerical analysis: We provide a numerical analysis by
applying an algorithm and the pricing model as proposed by
Sumbwanyambe and Nel in [2] as follows:
Π = λ
((
βp2
pth1
)−α
− 1
)
(p2 − c)
+λ
((
p2
pth2
)−α
− 1
)
(p2 − c) (1)
To find the optimal prices and an optimal subsidy rate
at which no user will unilaterally change his decision, we
consider the service provider’s profit maximization problem
(see equation 1). Oftentimes finding such optimal prices entails
checking all the likely values of p2 and subsidy factor β and
ask ourselves “is this a Nash Equilibrium?” At times it is
possible to eliminate actions iteratively to narrow the cases that
need to be checked. Since, profit functions are continuously
differentiable, concave and the price p2 is always positive, we
can take the first order conditions of Π as follows:
∂Π
∂p2
=
λ
( βp2pth1 )
α − 1 +
λ
( p2pth2 )
α − 1
+
λα(c− p2)
pth2(
p2
pth2
)α+1
+
λαβ(c− p2)
pth1(
βp2
pth1
)α+1
(2)
To find the concavity of of the above profit function, we take
the partial derivatives of Equation 2. Clearly, the second order
conditions imply that marginal profits should slope downwards
with respect to the ISP’s own action. Further differentiation of
equation 2 provides us with an expression as follows:
∂2Π
∂p22
= −
(
2λα
(pth2
p2
pth2
)α + 1
)
−
(
2λαβ
(pth1
βp2
pth1
)α + 1
)
−
(
λα(c− p2)(α+ 1)
(p2th2(
p2
pth2
)α+2
)
−
(
λαβ2(c− p2)(α+ 1)
p2th1(
βp2
pth1
)α+2
)
(3)
To begin with, we assume that the government and the
service provider lowers the price and the subsidy factor as
shown in Table I. At NE selfish users will use the network
resources without restraint. Given that the price is low, and
government is heavily subsidizing the information “have nots”,
there will be an increase in the number of users trying to
maximize their utility which may lead to the tragedy of
commons. Consider again, that this time the service provider
increases its price and the government heavily subsidizes the
information “have nots”. As observed from Table I, increasing
the subsidy and increasing the price p2 without consideration
will result in the information “haves” failing to pay for the
network services when the price set reaches the reservation
price pth2. For example when the price of network services
is approximately equal or above the reservation price, the
information “haves” won’t be able to pay for the network
services i.e. pth2 = 100 = p2. This scenario may result
in the free rider’s problem and may disrupt the once stable
telecommunication market or economic system of the country.
Table II paints a picture of how the value of subsidy factor β
affects the number of information “have nots”. At no subsidy
or when subsidy from the government is approximately equal
to zero, the numbers of information “have nots” users won’t
be able to pay for the service because p1 = pth1. Table III and
Table IV shows the effect of users’ sensitivity towards price
at different values of β.
Graphical analysis: In Figure 1, 2 and 3, we evaluate
the effect of subsidy on revenue maximization, given any
price p2 and the threshold price of consumers i.e. pth1 and
pth2 at a constant sensitivity α. Figure 1, for example, shows
that for a subsidy factor of β = 1 (in this case we assume
that the government does not subsidize the information “have
nots”), the revenue generated from the information “have
nots” is, actually, dependent on the threshold value or the
maximum reservation price pth1 that they are willing to
pay. This phenomenon, especially in underserviced areas of
developing countries, may sometimes result in the tragedy of
anti-commons since very few information “have nots” will
be more willing to subscribe to the ISP. For all intents and
purposes, it is worthwhile to note that the information “haves
nots” are contributing very little towards the ISP’s overall
revenue since no subsidy is being given by the government
towards the ISP (see Figure 2). In order to obtain maximum
revenue from the users (as shown in Figure 1), it will be
meaningful for the ISP to charge the information “have nots”
and “haves” an optimal price of 30 units so as to maximize
revenue.
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TABLE I
EXPECTED AMOUNT OF REVENUE WITH VARYING p2 : WHEN pth1 = 40, pth2 = 100
Users Pth1 Pth2 P2 P1 β α Revenue Normalized number of users
N1 40 20 5 0.1 0.3 291.30 1.4565
N2 100 20 5 0.1 0.3 124.13 0.6207
N1 40 50 20 0.1 0.3 692.85 0.8661
N2 100 50 20 0.1 0.3 184.91 0.2311
N1 40 90 35 0.1 0.3 903.02 0.5644
N2 100 90 35 0.1 0.3 51.38 0.0321
N1 40 100 40 0.1 0.3 928.28 0.5157
N2 100 100 40 0.1 0.3 0 0
TABLE II
EXPECTED AMOUNT OF REVENUE WITH VARYING β: WHEN pth1 = 40, pth2 = 100
Users Pth1 Pth2 P2 P1 β α Revenue Normalized number of users
N1 40 50 5 0.1 0.3 692.00 0.8661
N2 100 50 5 0.1 0.3 184.00 0.2311
N1 40 50 20 0.4 0.3 184.91 0.2311
N2 100 50 20 0.4 0.3 184.00 0.2311
N1 40 50 35 0.7 0.3 32.69 0.0409
N2 100 50 35 0.7 0.3 184.00 0.2311
N1 40 50 40 0.8 0.3 0 0
N2 100 50 40 0.8 0.3 184.00 0.2311
TABLE III
EXPECTED AMOUNT OF REVENUE WITH VARYING α: WHEN pth1 = 40, pth2 = 100
Users Pth1 Pth2 P2 P1 β α Revenue Normalized number of users
N1 40 50 5 0.3 0.1 57.41 0.1031
N2 100 50 5 0.3 0.1 57.41 0.0718
N1 40 50 20 0.3 0.3 184.91 0.3421
N2 100 50 20 0.3 0.3 184.91 0.2311
N1 40 50 35 0.3 0.7 499.60 0.9869
N2 100 50 35 0.3 0.7 499.60 0.6245
N1 40 50 40 0.3 1 800.00 1.6667
N2 100 50 40 0.3 1 800.00 1
TABLE IV
OPTIMAL SUBSIDY RATE, β , WITH VARYING pth1 AND pth2 : WHEN α1 = 0.4, α2 = 0.7
Type of Users Pth1 Pth2 P2 P1 β α ISP Revenue
N1 10 50 5.5 0.11 0.4 216.119
N2 90 50 5.5 0.11 0.7 407.2042
N1 40 50 16.55 0.331 0.4 338.66
N2 120 50 16.55 0.331 0.7 676.55
N1 70 50 27 0.54 0.4 216.119
N2 130 50 27 0.54 0.7 407.304
Since the main aim of the government is to promote social
and economic growth in underserviced regions, Figure 2 would
represent a much more desirable scenario in promoting social
and economical development in underserviced areas (ICT
access for all in developing countries). In actual fact, Figure
2 represents a desirable outcome that will objectively fulfill
government policies, as it allows more information “have nots”
to subscribe to the ISP at a subsidized price. However, such a
situation would definitely promote the tragedy of the commons
and may lead to market failure in once stable markets. A
more close analysis of Figure 2, in reality, reveals that the
information “haves” will fail to subscribe to the ISP, at a
higher price e.g. at 100 units. Since this is the reservation
price of information “haves”. Thus, Figure 2 highlights the
implications of heavy subsidy towards revenue maximization
in a heterogeneous society, and shows that at an optimal price
of 80 units (partially paid by the government) there will be a
skewed information access between the information “haves”
and the information “have nots” due to unbalanced subsidy
distribution. Figure 4, on the other hand shows, that the
revenue of an ISP is maximum at an optimal price of 40 units.
In our view, Figure 3 represents an equilibrated game between
the information “haves” and “have nots” as the price of both
groups seem to follow the same trajectory. Actually, Figure
4 presents a case where both groups of users seem to follow
the same trajectory price and revenue path. Both users (as
depicted in Figure 4) will not subscribe to the ISP at the same
reservation price or threshold price of pth2. Contrary to Figure
1 and 2, Figure 3 represents a desirable outcome between the
information “haves” and “have nots” as it represents the same
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Fig. 2. Revenue versus price alpha = 0.3 pth1 = 40 pth2 = 100 β = 0.1
Fig. 3. Revenue versus price alpha = 0.3 pth1 = 40 pth2 = 100 β = 1
Fig. 4. Revenue versus price alpha = 0.3 pth1 = 40 pth2 = 100 β = 0.4
price versus revenue curve trajectory for both the information
“haves” and “have nots”. Generally, Figure 3, in point of fact,
may somehow prevent the tragedy of the commons and tragedy
of the anti-commons in heterogeneous society as no member
of a group is disadvantage due to skewed pricing.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have analyzed the effect of subsidy driven
procedure on the resource usage and revenue maximization
in heterogeneous communities. We have shown that if im-
plemented properly, subsidies can prevent the tragedy of the
(anti) commons and could be the solution to promoting social
and economical growth in developing countries. Our proposed
subsidy driven pricing model addresses the importance of a
balanced subsidy pricing scheme with a view of achieving
social and economical growth while enhancing the usage of
network resources efficiently. Using this framework, we have
shown that a government subsidy in a developing country
can result in the increase or decrease of information “have
nots” leading to the tragedy of (anti) commons. We have also
shown that a correct subsidy, given customer sensitivities, can
promote desired revenue and that the revenue is a concave
function of price. Thus far, we have derived the optimal
revenue given the price, subsidy factor β and α as shown
in the Figures of 2, 3 and 4.
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